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EU CRISIS MANAGEMENT 
AND CONFLICT PREvENTION
IDENTIFYING INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINS
FOR EARLY WARNING ANALYSIS UTILIZATION1
Early warning systems are responsible for monitoring crisis situations and gener-
ating warning signals of situations which escalate and pose a threat to internation-
al and human security. The application of this instrument often determines the 
success of preventive measures and efficiency of further crisis management. Being 
aware of the importance of this mechanism, the EU invested substantial resources 
for its development within the CFSP/CSDP framework. Nonetheless, the faulty 
institutional design and insufficient analytical capabilities of the EEAS put the 
applicability of the system in question. The article analyses a set of early warning 
institutional arrangements embedded in CFSP/CSDP institutional structure. In 
doing so, it describes and examines the main institutional and systemic constrains 
of early warning utilization in the EU conflict prevention framework.
Key words: conflict prevention, early warning systems, Common Foreign and 
Security Policy, European External Action Service
Słowa kluczowe: zapobieganie konfliktom, system wczesnego ostrzegania, Wspól na 
Polityka Zagraniczna i Bezpieczeństwa, Europejska Służba Działań Zew nętrznych
1 The article was prepared using empirical material gathered in the course of the graduate research 
project entitled “Knowledge with Muscle. Early Warning Utilization in the EU Conflict Prevention 
Framework” (2011 -6274498). The project was funded by the Graduate School of Social Sciences, 
University of Amsterdam. All the interviews were conducted in between April -June 2011. 
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For the past 20 years, the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has un-dergone numerous modifications, which resulted in the establishment of a unique 
institutional blend of interlocking instruments and competencies.2 Within this specific 
setting, the EU has begun to develop conceptual, political, and institutional background 
for making conflict prevention a distinctive characteristic of the EU engagement in the 
global arena.3 With the adoption of the Gothenburg Programme, European Security 
Strategy and the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU has argued that conflict and threat prevention 
cannot start too early, and that early identification and understanding of risk factors in-
creases the chances of timely and effective action to address the underlying causes of conflict.4 
With this assumption in mind, the EU invested substantial resources in the develop-
ment of preventive measures and crisis management capacities, which eventually placed 
the early conflict warning system at the heart of the EU conflict prevention toolbox.5
Early Warning System (EWS) is commonly considered as an essential element of 
an effective conflict prevention capacity.6 It can be defined as the ability to collect and 
analyse information in the interest of providing strategic choices for preventive action or, 
as may be required, an informed response.7 The idea behind the system is that it can 
predict the development of crises and produce warnings and viable response options 
in a timely manner. The analysis has to be not only accurate, but also compatible with 
a specific institutional layout and political agenda of the organization it is addressed to. 
This is when the efficiency of early warnings becomes questionable. The so -called early 
warning -response gap is a well -known issue in the global and regional conflict preven-
tion and crisis management frameworks. The literature indicates a whole range of rea-
sons behind the inefficiency of the analysis, one of which is institutional constraint.8 
Arjen Boin et al. describes institutional constrains as communication inefficiency and 
individual or collective inability to process and produce information in the times of 
crisis.9 He argues that in complex institutional frameworks, crisis situations can be, and 
2 See M.E. Smith, Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy. The Institutionalization of Cooperation, Cam-
bridge 2004.
3 See B. Romsloe, “EUs utenriks - og sikkerhetspolitikk – teori og praksis”, Internasjonal politikk, vol. 63, 
no. 1 (2005), pp. 89 -108.
4 A Secure Europe in a Better World – European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003.
5 See E. Gross, A.E. Juncos, EU Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management. Roles, Institutions, and Pol-
icies, London–New York 2010.
6 See J.L. Davies, T.R. Gurr, Preventive Measures. Building Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Sys-
tems, Lanham 1998.
7 S. Rusu, “Principles and Practice of Conflict Early Warning”, Conflict, Security & Development, vol. 1, 
no. 2 (2001), p. 132, at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14678800100590613>. 
8 See K. van Walraven, Early Warning and Conflict Prevention. Limitations and Possibilities, The Hague 
1998.
9 See A. Boin, P. ’t Hart, A. McConnell, “Crisis Exploitation: Political and Policy Impacts of Framing 
Contests”, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 16, no. 1 (2009), pp. 81 -106, at <http://dx.doi.org/
10.1080/13501760802453221>. 
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often are, managed ineffectively. This can be attributed to a number of reasons, be it 
a high number of analytical units, ambiguous procedures and policies, or simply inter-
-departmental competition over influence and position in the expertise -making envi-
ronment.10 This set of specific problems is often attributed to global organizations, 
which commonly struggle with defective institutional designs, conflict of interests and 
competencies, or cognitive biases.11
The EU conflict prevention framework certainly fits this profile being a patchwork 
of commission - and council -based mechanisms; it can pose several challenges for fully 
functional early warning and conflict prevention policy.
The following article analyses a set of institutional arrangements embedded in 
CFSP/CSDP institutional structure. In doing so, it describes and examines the main 
institutional and systemic constrains of early warning utilization in the EU conflict 
prevention framework. The first part of the article focuses on the principal theories of 
the so -called early warning response gap. It emphasizes the main reasons behind unsuc-
cessful performance of preventive policies and focuses on possible explanations for the 
gap. The second section of the article is devoted to the description of the institutional 
design of the EU conflict prevention framework. It outlines the most important com-
ponent sources of information involved in the process of early warning production, 
dissemination and utilization. The last section focuses on examination of institutional 
constraints which decrease the efficiency of the EU conflict prevention policies.
WARNING -RESPONSE GAP – AN INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIvE
The so -called early warning -response gap represents a situation when timely delivered 
information on a potential conflict fails to generate a proper political response.12 Such 
a problem of responsiveness to early warnings is attributed to several issues ranging 
from different threat perceptions among decision makers, bystander syndrome, ineffec-
tive delivery of warnings and, last but not least, institutional constraints.13
Institutional constraints refer to specific technical limitations that make dissemina-
tion and delivery of early warnings much more challenging. One of the main aspects 
of the institutional constraints is flawed organizational design of a conflict preven-
tion framework. This problem refers mainly to the excessively polycentric early warn-
ing systems scattered all around the institution. According to Zenko, such a situation 
contributes to informational chaos and further issues with analysis dissemination and 
10 See A. Boin et al., The Politics of Crisis Management, New York 2005, p. 34.
11 See D. Carment, K. Garner, “Early Warning and Conflict Prevention: Problems, Pitfalls and Avenues 
for Success”, Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, vol. 6, no. 2 (1999), pp. 103 -121, at <http://dx.doi.org
/10.1080/11926422.1999.9673176>. 
12 H. Adelman, S. Schmeidl, “Towards the Development of an Early Warning/Response Network”, 
Re fuge, vol. 15, no. 4 (1996), pp. 21 -27.
13 See A. Austin, “Early Warning and The Field: A Cargo Cult Science?”, in idem, M. Fischer, N. Ropers 
(eds.), Transforming Ethnopolitical Conflict, Wiesbaden 2004, pp. 129 -150.
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communication between analytical units.14 It should be noted that before a warning 
reaches a policy -maker, it has to cover a distance between several analytical units and 
departments involved in the conflict prevention framework; the bigger the distance, 
physical and otherwise, the smaller the chance of success of an early warning.15
Another aspect of institutional constraints focuses on the problem of different 
strategic or security cultures that may be engaged in the early warning system and 
conflict prevention framework. Choo argues that analytical coherence within the 
system is absolutely essential in order to produce clear and usable information for 
a decision maker.16 That is why it is crucial that the ‘analysts -warners’ are not only 
a part of the same system, but also share the same ‘playbook’, that is identification of 
threats and understanding of responses viable for the organization they work for.17 
Thus, the ‘warners’ also have a responsibility to educate themselves in the decision-
-making mechanisms of their organization. Empirical evidence shows that the greater 
familiarity early warning analysts have with policy making mechanism, the easier it is 
to write warnings intended for specific responses.18 In this regard, a complex and un-
predictable decision making environment seriously affects the efficiency of the early 
warning system.
The third dimension of institutional constraints refers to conflict of interest and 
competencies. It builds on the two previously mentioned issues and leads to potential 
conflicts between analytical components involved in the early warning system. There is 
an interesting body of literature exploring the phenomenon of interest -based behavior 
among intelligence and analytical units involved in security policies.19 Apparently, in 
a situation when competencies are not clearly indicated in the organizational frame-
work, the units involved in the system tend to use their powers to assume dominant po-
sition and place themselves as close to the decision maker as possible.20 Such a situation 
is counter -productive and potentially leads to conflict within the framework.
14 See M. Zenko, R.R. Friedman, “UN Early Warning for Preventing Conflict”, International 
Peacekeeping, vol. 18, no. 1 (2011), p. 25, at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2011.527504>. 
15 See A. Ricci (ed.), From Early Warning to Early Action? The Debate on the Enhancement of the EU’s 
Crisis Response Capability Continues, Brussels 2008.
16 C.W. Choo, “Information Use and Early Warning Effectiveness: Perspectives and Prospects”, Journal 
of the American Society for Information Science and Technology, vol. 60, no. 5 (2009), pp. 1071 -1082, at 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/asi.21038>. 
17 See B. Pohl, “The Logic Underpinning EU Crisis Management Operations”, European Security, 
vol. 22, no. 3 (2013), p. 320, at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2012.726220>.
18 See B. Harff, T.R. Gurr, “Systematic Early Warning of Humanitarian Emergencies”, Journal of Peace 
Research, vol. 35, no. 5 (1998), p. 561, at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022343398035005002>.
19 See M. Phythian, P. Gill, S. Marrin (eds.), Intelligence Theory. Key Questions and Debates, London– 
–New York 2008.
20 See M. Dunn Cavelty, V. Mauer, “Postmodern Intelligence: Strategic Warning in an Age of Re-
flexive Intelligence”, Security Dialogue, vol. 40, no. 2 (2009), pp. 123 -144, at <http://dx.doi.
org/10.1177/0967010609103071>. 
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EU CONFLICT PREvENTION FRAMEWORK – 
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
Studying utilization of early warning mechanisms and conflict prevention polices re-
quires identification of two basic communities within the framework – ‘warnees’ and 
‘warners’. In this case, the decision -making environment is considered to be the ‘warn-
ees’, embedded in the Council of European Union. The ‘warners’, on the other hand, 
represent the community of the so called ‘knowledge producers’ responsible for the 
development and dissemination of early warning analysis.21 This differentiation may 
seem straight forward, but within such a complex institutional design as the European 
Union traditional divisions become blurred.
The most common point of reference for the ‘warners’ community is the European 
External Action Service (EEAS) with the Office of the High Representative of the Un-
ion for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice -President of the Commission (HR/
VP) in command.22 As Hynek indicates, the EEAS and its analytical capability is rather 
a patchwork than a coherent and fully -fledged system.23 Such an opinion stems from the 
fact that the EEAS is in its essence a sum of intergovernmental (originated in the Coun-
cil) and communitarian (originated in the European Commission) components of the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy.24 In the aftermath of the Lisbon Treaty reform 
and the adoption of the comprehensive approach to conflict prevention, the EU started 
pooling its analytical resources under one institutional framework. The comprehensive 
approach (CA) is a guiding principle behind the prevention and management of exter-
nal conflicts and crises at the EU level. It calls for consistency between different areas of 
EU external actions and close cooperation within its political and institutional frame-
work.25 The comprehensive approach places special emphasis on the development of 
shared analysis in order to improve situational awareness in regard to external crises and 
conflicts. This applies to all the components involved in early warning and preparedness, 
conflict prevention, crisis response and management and early recovery.26 This is how 
21 See H. Adelman, A. Suhrke, Early Warning and Conflict Management, Steering Committee of the 
Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, Kopenhagen 1996.
22 See S. Keukeleire, T. Delreux, The Foreign Policy of the European Union, Houndmills–New York 2014, 
pp. 23 -45.
23 N. Hynek, “EU Crisis Management after the Lisbon Treaty: Civil -Military Coordination and the Fu-
ture of the EU OHQ”, European Security, vol. 20, no. 1 (2011), p. 94, at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080
/09662839.2011.556622>. 
24 See T. Henökl, “Conceptualizing the European Diplomatic Space: A Framework for Analysis of the 
European External Action Service”, Journal of European Integration, vol. 36, no. 5 (2014), pp. 453 -471, 
at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2013.865731>. 
25 See A. Mazurkiewicz, “NATO and EU Approach Towards Civil -Military Relations”, Polityka i Społe-
czeństwo, vol. 2, no. 12 (2014), pp. 125 -140.
26 Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, The EU’s comprehensive approach 
to external conflict and crises ( JOIN/2013/0030), Brussels, 11 December 2013.
132 Politeja 4(49)/2017Maciej Stępka
the EEAS inherited the supporting bodies and the chain of command from the Councils’ 
Secretariat, with the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), the Situational 
Centre and European Union Military Staff.27 As a result of the reforms and institutional 
reconfigurations, the EEAS has at its disposal a number of resources including special-
ized departments and agencies responsible for analyzing and monitoring conflict zones 
all around the globe and putting conflict prevention and early warning at the heart of 
the EU external policies.28 In that regard, the overseeing directorate (CSDP and Crisis 
Response) coordinates or cooperates with the following components which are involved 
in the EU early warning system:
1. Conflict Prevention, Peace -building and Mediation Division (CPPMD) – the di-
vision operates under the supervision of Security Policy and Conflict Prevention
Department and is responsible for the monitoring of implementation of the Goth-
enburg Programme. The role of CPPMD is not entirely clear even among secu-
rity practitioners and politicians dealing with the EEAS. According to empirical
research, the division is identified as both early warning provider and the horizontal 
coordinator of units involved in early warning information gathering and sharing.29
In fact, CPPMD is responsible for a little bit of both. It provides operation support
to the EEAS country teams in order to shorten the distance between ‘warners’ and
‘warnees’.30 It also gathers information from other field offices identifying and man-
aging risks. Thus, it is not only a rigid predictive mechanism, but also one of the first 
units which analyzes possible preventive measures.31
2. European Union Military Staff (EUMS) – after the Lisbon Treaty, the EUMS was
transferred from the Council of European Union to the EEAS and represents the
only military body within the EEAS analytical framework. The EUMS is a vital
part of the European conflict prevention machinery, but it does not fall under the
CSDP and Crisis Response supervision. It consists of mainly military experts sec-
onded by the Member States and feeds primarily on information delivered by the
national intelligence services.32 The Staff provides opinions and expertise in the
field of military related issues as well as civilian crisis management.33
27 N. Hynek, “EU Crisis Management…”, p. 93.
28 The EEAS is also responsible for implementation of preventive and mitigating measures, however it is 
not within the scope of this article. For more information please see E. Gross, A.E. Juncos, EU Conflict 
Prevention...
29 T. Beswick, EU Early Warning and Response Capacity for Conflict Prevention in the Post -Lisbon Era, 
The Hague 2012.
30 See I. Manners, “Sociology of Knowledge and Production of Normative Power in the European 
Union’s External Actions”, Journal of European Integration, vol. 37, no. 2 (2015), pp. 299 -318, at 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2014.990141>. 
31 See T. Beswick, EU Early Warning...
32 See G. Hauser, F. Kernic (eds.), European Security in Transition, Aldershot 2006, p. 47.
33 See B. Tonra, “European Union Security Dynamics: In the New National Interest”, European Security, 
vol. 20, no. 4 (2011), pp. 608 -610, at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2010.528405>. 
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3. EU Intelligence and Situation Centre (INTCEN) – as a result of several institu-
tional reforms, the Centre has become possibly the most influential and dynamic
early warning mechanism within the EU conflict prevention framework.34 It in-
cludes national and open source intelligence capabilities as well as the resources of
the Situation Room and Consular Crisis Management.35 The INTCEN is respon-
sible for constant monitoring of the fragile states and conflict sensitive regions, and
produces the most up -to -date early warning analyses.36 The Centre handles secure
communication feeds from foreign affairs offices, security agencies and intelligence
communities. At the same time, it works in close cooperation with the EUMS un-
der Single Intelligence Capacity framework.37
The Gothenburg Programme committed the EU to enhancing conflict prevention
tools, including early warning and response capabilities. The main idea was to calibrate 
and redesign preventive analysis for planning, decision -making and evaluative purpos-
es. The programme clearly states that the principle objective of the EU external and se-
curity policy is to monitor potential conflict situations on the basis of accurate information 
and analysis, as well as design clear options for action for both long -term and short -term 
prevention.38 In order to meet these commitments, the EU has been developing an im-
pressive range of potential sources of early warning information including geospatial, 
human, open -source and signals intelligence.39 Table 1 describes some examples of the 
most commonly identified sources of early warnings.
Table 1. Examples of early warning mechanisms in the EU
Sources of Early 
Warnings
Origin Description
Country Strategy 
Papers (CSP)
EEAS Country Strategy Papers are essential to the EU early warning sys-
tem. CSPs are prepared by the European External Action Service 
(conflict prevention units and respective delegations) with input 
from the Member States. At first, the analysis was designed to sup-
port the European Development Fund and the donor community, 
but with time it changed into a risk assessment analysis. The stan-
dard Country Strategy Paper consists of 1) framework of relations 
between the EU and the country of interest; 2) country diagnosis; 
3) assessment of past and present cooperation; 4) strategy for fu-
ture actions. The latest edition of the papers covers 141 countries.
34 See L. Montanaro, J. Schünemann, Walk the Talk. The EU Needs an Effective Early Warning System to 
Match its Ambitions to Prevent Conflict and Promote Peace, Madrid 2011.
35 EEAS Organizational Chart, at <http://eeas.europa.eu/background/docs/organisation_en.pdf>, 
9 March 2016.
36 T. Beswick, EU Early Warning..., pp. 7 -8.
37 E. Gross, A.E. Juncos, EU Conflict Prevention..., p. 61.
38 Presidency Conclusions, EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts (Gothenburg Pro-
gramme), Gothenburg, 15 -16 June 2001, p. 12.
39 See L. Freedman, “The Politics of Warning: Terrorism and Risk Communication”, Intelligence and Na-
tional Security, vol. 20 (2005), pp. 379 -418, at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520500281502>.
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Watchlist EEAS
The 
Council
The Watchlist is a confidential biannual report on the countries 
which are of strategic importance for the EU. The report includes 
special supplements on terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, 
regional conflicts, migration towards the EU and environmen-
tal threats. The list is the main driver of the work program of the 
EUMS and INTCEN. It is prepared at the EEAS, but it is con-
trolled by the PSC, which submits new themes and countries for 
analysis.
Tariqa 3 EEAS The most sophisticated data gathering system built explicitly for 
early warning purposes. Developed by the Commission, Tariqa 3 
feeds on multiple sources (open and secret) including Lexis Nexis, 
Factivia, Latest News (press agencies), Google, Oxford Analitica, 
Proquest (academia) etc. The system utilizes text and audio -video 
based sources using the most advanced search engines. Tariqa 3 
enables cluster based analysis and scenario drawings, which ma-
kes it suitable for identification of commonalities and behavioral 
trends among targeted countries or regions. Tariqa’s scenario dra-
wing isolates weak and strong signals and calculates the impact of 
a given factor in regard to security situation and conflict dynamics.
EU Special 
Representatives 
(EUSR)
EEAS EUSRs promote stabilization as well as policies and interests of 
the EU in the troubled countries and regions. They play a vital 
role in the conflict prevention framework since they are obliga-
ted to update and report to CSFSP/CSDP institutions and assist 
them in identifying recommendations and options for potential 
responses to emerging crisis situations. 
Regional Crisis 
Response Planning 
Officer (RCRPO)
EEAS RCRPOs are one of the most promising developments in the EU 
conflict prevention framework. They work as officials within the 
EU delegations’ political departments and are exclusively respon-
sible for monitoring conflict dynamics and early identification of 
crises. 
Virtuoso40 
(Versatile 
Information 
Toolkit for End 
Users Oriented 
Open Source 
Exploitation)
EEAS The state of the art mechanism which is supposed to be a one -stop 
platform for the use of all analytic tools. Virtuoso is a surveillan-
ce and data gathering tool which feeds mainly on open source 
information. It is designed to find, select, and acquire information 
from public sources and analyze it to provide relevant information 
useful to the decision -maker. The project Virtuoso was concluded 
in 2013 and its utilization and wider implementation in the EEAS 
conflict prevention framework have not yet been finalized.
Source: own elaboration.40
The EU conflict prevention framework includes additional supporting agencies 
working in close cooperation, but not within, the EEAS main institutional frame – 
the European Union Satellite Centre (EUSC) and the European Union Institute for 
40 EEAS Website, at <http://eeas.europa.eu/background/organisation/index_en.htm>, 7 March 2016; 
European Commission Website, at <http://ec.europa.eu/index_en.htm>, 8 March 2016; Council of 
European Union Website, at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/home/>, 8 March 2016; Virtuo-
so Project Website, at <http://www.virtuoso.eu>, 9 March 2016.
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Security Studies (EUISS). The EUSC contributes to the early warning system by 
producing specialized expertise in the areas of satellite imaging and geospatial intel-
ligence.41 It supports conflict prevention and crisis management thematic directorates 
within the EEAS as well as the European Commission. The Centre coordinates several 
joint projects including the “Global Monitoring for Environment and Security” and 
“Global Monitoring for Security and Stability”, which are designed to directly interface 
with the EU early warning and conflict management departments.42 The EUISS plays 
a clear -cut role in the EU conflict prevention domain serving as a think tank respon-
sible for long -term security analysis dissemination of research on the EU foreign and 
security policy. The Institute works as an analytical capacity and a forum for debate be-
tween external experts and decision makers. The EUISS produces strategic prognosis 
on the state of the EU foreign and security policies and contributes to further advance-
ment of the EU strategic culture.43 As Table 1 indicates, the European Union does not 
suffer from the lack of early warning information or even knowledge dissemination sys-
tems. So the question is why the European Union still struggles with the absorption of 
early warnings and what are the main systemic constraints responsible for that?
Despite the fact that the Lisbon Treaty incorporated a large portion of external af-
fairs to the EEAS, the whole process of decision -making remained within the Coun-
cil’s competencies. The Council of European Union and the High Representative can 
be defined as the primary customers (‘warnees’) of the EU early warning system. They 
represent the peak of the institutional machinery governing the EU conflict prevention 
framework. That includes taking decisions on the development of new resources and 
implementation of preventive actions and civilian or military missions.44 However, the 
proceedings within the Council are not limited to the ministers of the Member States 
and include additional bodies responsible for supporting the decision -making process.
The specialized working groups and committees45 are involved in the initial phase 
of decision -making in the Council. They serve as preparatory bodies where the na-
tional representatives set up negotiations and develop a preliminary plan for further 
proceedings. In the case of conflict prevention and security framework, the prepara-
tory bodies process the initial early warnings and formulate secondary recommenda-
tions for their respective ministers and ambassadors.46 In this way, the working groups 
support the Political and Security Committee (PSC), which is described as one the 
most important bodies in the EU foreign and security policy institutional framework. 
The Committee presides at the level of national representatives (ambassadors) and is 
41 See A. Gruszczak, “Technologie satelitarne na rzecz bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej”, Kultura 
i Polityka, no. 16 (2014), pp. 94 -113.
42 See EU Satellite Centre Webiste, at <https://www.satcen.europa.eu>, 8 March 2016.
43 See EU Institute for Security Studies, at <http://www.iss.europa.eum>, 8 March 2016.
44 See J. Peterson, S. Helene, A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? Competing Visions of the CFSP, Lon-
don–New York 2005.
45 To exemplify: Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CivCom), Politico -Military 
Group, Military Committee Working Group, European Union Military Committee (EUMC).
46 See P. Koutrakos, The EU Common Security and Defence Policy, Oxford 2013, p. 42.
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chaired by a European official appointed by the High Representative. In order to assure 
coherence of the EU preventive actions, the Committee allows (on ad hoc basis) par-
ticipation of representatives from other relevant conflict prevention institutions.47 Ac-
cording to its mandate, the PSC is responsible for monitoring the international situation 
in the areas covered by the CFSP, defining policies and delivering opinion to the Council,48 
In that sense, it proposes initial response options to the Council of Foreign Affairs and 
the High Representative.
In such complex institutional designs as the EU, the relationship between the ‘warn-
er’ and ‘warnee’ is not always straightforward. The institutional layout of the conflict 
prevention framework substantially impacts the efficiency of the early warning system. 
The analysis does not always reach the decision maker and preventive measures are not 
always formulated and launched in a timely manner. The whole purpose of the EU ear-
ly warning systems is to enable evidence -based conflict prevention policy which would 
increase the efficiency of the European Union as a global actor and security provider. 
However, is it possible to reach this goal and high efficiency of the system while at the 
same time supporting a complex and often incoherent institutional framework?
INSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS FOR EARLY WARNING 
UTILIZATION
This section identifies and discusses some of the main institutional and systemic con-
straints of early warning utilization within the EU conflict prevention framework. It is 
based on a series of semi -structured interviews conducted in Brussels between May and 
June 2011. The research sample was based on analysts assigned to work for or within 
the EUMS, Situation Room and the CPPMD. The key criticism which stems from the 
gathered material can be narrowed down to the following three aspects: 1) unclear di-
vision of competencies; 2) different working and analysis -making cultures; 3) lack of 
individual and collective capacity to manage information on violent crises.49
The institutional design of the EU conflict prevention and crisis management can 
be confusing even for a person familiar with the EU external and security policies.50 
The number of units responsible for analysis and decision -making, their competencies 
and the additional issues concerning the national and European politics have created 
47 See C. Steindler, “Mapping Out the Institutional Geography of External Security in the EU”, Europe-
an Security, vol. 24, no. 3 (2015), pp. 402 -419, at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2015.1028
187>. 
48 See J. Rehrl, H. -B. Weisserth (eds.), Handbook on CSDP. The Common Security and Defence Policy of 
the European Union, Directorate for Security Policy of the Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports of 
the Republic of Austria, Vienna 2010.
49 See L. Montanaro, J. Schünemann, Walk the Talk...
50 See D. Spence, “The Early Days of the European External Action Service: A Practitioner’s View”, 
The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, vol. 7, no. 1 (2012), pp. 119 -121, at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/ 
187119112X615098>. 
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a blurry and distorted image of the framework.51 This situation is the result of an un-
equal development of the institutions and instruments and the lack of internal integ-
rity within the CFSP .52 In fact, the conflict prevention framework has undergone sev-
eral changes in the last decade.53 The pre -Lisbon early warning components like Policy 
Planning and Early Warning Unit have been rearranged or incorporated into the new 
thematic directorates within the EEAS. Even experts and academics cannot agree on 
the coherent description of the early warning and conflict prevention system in the 
EU.54 The most common indications of the central point of the system are either the 
INTCEN (civilian) or the EUMS (military).55 Indeed, these two units are responsi-
ble for most of the early warning analysis produced within the EU. At the same time, 
the empirical data suggests that there is a conflict of interests and certain competition 
between them.56 This clash of military and civilian domains is not without basis. The 
EUMS was transferred from the intergovernmental institution (the Council) to a com-
munitarian body such as the EEAS. The Military Staff kept its separate military char-
acteristics and chain of command. According to the EEAS organization design, the 
EUMS remains separate from the main frame of the CSDP and Crisis Response Di-
rectorate and works directly under the High Representative.57 At the same time, the 
INTCEN has gained substantial resources with the incorporation of the former Joint 
Situation Centre and the development of its intelligence and analysis making capacity. 
After the Paris Attack of 2016, the Centre has also become one of the most important 
forums for the EU intelligence sharing and cooperation.58
The situation of unclear competencies may lead to decreased performance and uti-
lization of early warning within the framework. What is more important, it may con-
tribute to deepening the incoherence within the EU analysis making community. The 
Initiative for Peace -building -Early Warning Cluster conducted in 2013 a series of inter-
views with the EEAS experts and revealed that in fact within the EU conflict preven-
tion framework there is a dualistic interpretation of threats and challenges to interna-
tional security. The differences go even deeper and reflect on day -to -day cooperation. 
51 See S. Duke, “The European External Action Service: Antidote against Incoherence?”, European For-
eign Affairs Review, vol. 17, no. 1 (2012), pp. 45 -68.
52 See M.E. Smith, “The European External Action Service and the Security -Development Nexus: Or-
ganizing for Effectiveness or Incoherence?”, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 20, no. 9 (2013), 
pp. 1 -17, at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2012.758441>. 
53 See D. Spence, “The Early Days…” 
54 See L. Montanaro, J. Schünemann, Walk the Talk…; see also F. Cameron, An Introduction to European 
Foreign Policy, London–New York 2012, pp. 230 -265.
55 See ibid.
56 See T. Beswick, Improving Institutional Capacity for Early Warning. Synthesis Report, The Hague 2012.
57 See S. Post, Toward a Whole -of -Europe Approach. Organizing the European Union’s and Member States’ 
Comprehensive Crisis Management, Berlin 2015.
58 See A. Gruszczak, “EU Intelligence -led Policing: The Case of Counter -terrorism Cooperation”, in 
M. O’Neill, K. Swinton, A. Winter (eds.), New Challenges for the EU Internal Security Strategy, New-
castle upon Tyne 2013, pp. 16 -39.
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The best example is the encryption incompatibilities between different early warning 
units, which affect inter -departmental cooperation and communication of shared early 
warnings.59 This incoherence stems from civilian and military analysis -making cultures 
embedded in the system. According to the research, the incoherence in identification 
of threats and interpretation of early warning signals may lead to risk aversion and low-
er the efficiency of the system. In other words, the inconsistencies in the definition of 
threats may lead to inaction due to unclear and incoherent prognosis.
The last major constraint concerns the EU capacity to process and disseminate early 
warnings within its institutional system. It may seem that the Union has caught itself in 
a comprehensiveness trap trying to feed on every source of information potentially use-
ful for early warning purposes.60 Currently, there are twenty sources of early warnings 
subscribed to the conflict prevention framework.61 Since the early days of the EEAS, 
it has been known that its institutional and human capacity is not sufficient to process 
the amount of information that flows into the EU early warning system.62 Moreover, 
the analysis making units feed on all types of intelligence without having specialized 
resources and coherent methodologies in place.63 The raw data needs to be processed 
consecutively by several departments in order to be usable by the decision makers and 
it takes time. Finally, the insufficient capacity to manage the information affects the 
potential for timely early response. Even though there is a substantial amount of early 
warnings existing in the framework, there are no communication capabilities dedicated 
to conflict prevention. In fact, the analytical units are responsible for making and dis-
seminating information among the decision makers. This model of a conflict preven-
tion system undermines not only the effectiveness of the warnings but also the efficien-
cy of the whole system.
CONCLUSIONS
The early warning system is considered as an integral part of every conflict prevention 
framework. It is a watchdog capability which is tasked with monitoring crisis situations 
and generating early warning signals on situations which escalate and pose a threat to 
international and human security. The reason behind every system is to strengthen con-
flict prevention policies and facilitate evidence -based policymaking. Since 2001 and 
the introduction of the Gothenburg Programme, the European Union has begun em-
bracing early warning as a key element of its conflict prevention and crisis management 
59 See T. Beswick, Improving..., pp. 12 -13.
60 See C. Gourlay, “European Union Procedures and Resources for Crisis Management”, International 
Peacekeeping, vol. 11, no. 3 (2004), pp. 404 -421, at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1353331042000 
249019>. 
61 See L. Montanaro, J. Schünemann, Walk the Talk…, p. 22.
62 See T. Beswick, EU Early Warning…
63 See eadem, Improving..., p. 11.
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capacity. Alas, this process has not proceeded without problems. One of the major is-
sues with the framework concerns institutional constraints which obstruct utilization 
of early warnings. To put it differently, the institutional design and capacity of the sys-
tem makes it inefficient and problematic for the EU to commit to evidence -based for-
eign and security policy -making.
Since the origin of the CFSP/CSDP, the experts and scholars have been pointing 
out the lack of common voice within the EU foreign affairs domain.64 To counter this 
problem, the EEAS was established. Its main task was to overcome the differences and 
contribute to the common European security culture. Nonetheless, placing the frame-
work under control of one person and locking the analytical staff in the same build-
ing turned out to be merely the beginning of much needed reforms. Even though the 
EU has made a substantial progress in consolidating its conflict prevention capabilities, 
the institutional design struggles with internal problems and incompatibilities. One of 
the most important institutional constraints is the incoherence of security and analy-
sis making cultures. The differences between the civilian and military capabilities not 
only generate a conflict of interests, but they also lead to unnecessary tensions within 
the framework. Secondly, the institutional incapacity to manage the information pro-
cessing and dissemination poses a threat to the whole system. The massive inflow of raw 
data makes it impossible for the EU analysts to create advanced prognoses and recom-
mendations in a timely manner.
The EU conflict prevention framework is still in the making. The EEAS is a rela-
tively young institution which has a potential to become a key player in the global con-
flict prevention and crisis management framework. However, there is still need for the 
calibration of the system and further advancement of internal cohesion and institution-
al compatibility. Alas, conflict prevention and early warning are not considered as a pri-
ority in the current EU foreign policy. This may cause a setback in further development 
of the framework and the EU’s capability to act as a liable and effective global actor.
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